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Abstract 
The long-term health effects of petroleum related diving activities have been much debated 
in recent years. The case of the pioneer-divers has been well documented and as the use of 
divers continues to be a requirement in the petroleum industry, the issue of long-term 
health effects is currently on the agenda of the authorities, operators and diving 
entrepreneurs. 
The aim of this study has been to assess how good the existing safety barriers are with 
regard to long-term health monitoring of offshore divers. The focus area was soft defences 
in the form of regulations, standards and procedures with regard to offshore saturation 
diving on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. The safety barriers specifically identified were 
the requirement for offshore health certificate, certificate for offshore divers, pre- and post-
dive medical checks, and exposure assessment. In addition, two safety barriers where 
participation is voluntary were included, the 3-yearly medical examination and the annual 
health screening questionnaire.  
A qualitative method was employed and key informants from the diving industry were 
interviewed. Representatives from the authorities, diving entrepreneurs, and divers were 
selected as key informants. The latter were selected based on a short set of criteria related 
to diving history, and the remainder were selected based on having in-depth knowledge 
regarding the subject matter. In addition, data was obtained through personal 
communication with operator and persons with expertise within diving medicine. Data was 
collected and analysed, and the results discussed in light of relevant theoretical framework.  
The main findings from this study are that the effectiveness of the two voluntary safety 
barriers, which together with exposure assessment form part of a long-term health follow 
up program, is poor. Many divers are reluctant to participate due to factors such as 
suspicion, or no knowledge of its existence. Some divers reported that they have in fact not 
been invited to participate during a three-year period. Further, one diving entrepreneur´s 
organisation of the 3-yearly medical examination in particular, has much room for 
improvement. The medical examinations appear, at times, to be organised in an ad hoc 
manner, sometimes resulting in the contracted diving doctor being unable to accommodate 
the requests for these. As the effectiveness of both the 3-yearly medical examination and 
the annual health screening questionnaire relies first of all on divers actually participating 
in them, it goes without saying that the divers must then do just that, participate. In order to 
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participate, divers must first be invited to participate. With regard to the annual health-
screening questionnaire, the authorities and diving entrepreneurs identified low response 
rate as a challenge. Research suggests that divers as a group have a different risk 
perception than other offshore workers and a different safety culture. It would seem 
pertinent for diving entrepreneurs, as well as authorities and operators, to establish a good 
rapport with the divers in order to build up trust and good communication in both 
directions. By communicating the risks involved in saturation diving, and by disproving 
their concerns or suspicions, divers can better make informed decisions related to the 
safeguarding of their own long-term health. 
The originality of this study is that few, if any, have looked into the effectiveness of these 
safety barriers from a safety point of view. There exist layers of defences, but when looked 
at from an “organisational accident” perspective, it is argued that these layers are in fact 
based entirely on divers voluntary participation and to some extent coincidences.  
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1 Introduction 
”There is evidence that changes in bone, the CNS and the lung can be demonstrated in 
some divers who have not experienced a diving accident or other established 
environmental hazard. The changes are in most cases minor and do not influence the 
diver’s quality of life. However, the changes are of a nature that may influence the diver’s 
future health. The scientific evidence is limited, and future research is required to obtain 
adequate answers to the questions of long-term health effects of diving.” 
(Hope et al. 1993, as cited in NOU 2003:133) 
”The findings from this survey are consistent with the findings from the epidemiological 
surveys that was carried out on active divers in the latter half of the 1980s and are in line 
with the conclusions from the Godøysund conference. The changes in functionality that 
were detected and that correlated with cumulative diving exposure, was back then not 
regarded as having significance for the divers’ quality of life. The changes are now more 
pronounced, yield more clinical symptoms, and implies a significant deterioration in 
quality of life in a large proportion of the divers.” 
(Haukeland University Hospital, 2004:7) 
The working conditions and fate of the pioneer divers have been much discussed in the 
media during the course of the last decade. The pioneer period is defined as the years from 
1965 to 1990, and the pioneer divers are those persons who carried out petroleum related 
diving activities during that period (St.meld. nr. 47 (2002-2003)). The Petroleum Safety 
Authority (PSA) (2011:130) reports that during the period between 1967 until 2010 the 
number of diver fatalities was 14, which constituted 5.2% of total petroleum-related 
fatalities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. Between 1981 and 2010 diver fatalities 
constituted 11% of occupational accidents. Further, the PSA (2012) reports that in the 
period between 2009 until 2011, although the activity level was low, there were 11 
personal injuries related to saturation diving, 8 injuries in 2011 alone. The PSA produces 
an annual report entitled “Trends in risk level in the petroleum activity” in which the 
number of diving incidents and near misses are reported together with the activity levels 
for diving. However, the report specifies that reported cases of work related illness are not 
included as they are not regarded as a suitable indicator of risk (PSA, 2011). A report from 
Haukeland University Hospital (HUH) (2004) concerning pioneer divers found evidence to 
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suggest that diving can be detrimental to long-term health, which is supported by St.meld. 
nr. 12 (2005-2006) (Norwegian White Paper), stating that diving can cause late onset 
health problems. In light of this one may wonder why diving-related health effects are not 
considered when assessing status and trends for risks in the petroleum industry.  
The PSA (2012) reports that activity levels for saturation diving have been low on the NCS 
in recent years. However, representatives from the diving industry estimate that the activity 
level for offshore diving will be approximately 100 days per year, per diving entrepreneur 
during the next few years. This equates to approximately 40000-50000 hours of saturation 
diving. There are two main diving entrepreneurs operating in Norway. Activity levels on 
the British Continental Shelf (BCS) are much higher and this is due to the fact that there is 
more Diving Support Vessels (DSV) accepted for diving there. On the NCS the number of 
DSVs accepted for diving is very limited, and thus, the capacity for diving work is also 
limited. Diver safety is high on the agenda within the industry receiving focus not only 
from the PSA, but also unions and operators. The pressure is high on diving entrepreneurs 
to ensure sufficient risk management with regard to diver safety. In the Norwegian White 
paper no. 12 (2005-2006) it is emphasised that the current working conditions for divers in 
the Norwegian petroleum industry are safe. However, perhaps slightly contradictory to 
this, the same white paper refers to the conclusions from the international workshop 
”Long-term health effects of diving. The Godøysund 1993 consensus conference revisited” 
held in Bergen, Norway in 2005 (as cited in Molvær 2005:9). The consensus from the 
workshop was as follows (own translation):  
“Findings suggest that changes in lung function, central nervous system, skeleton, and 
hearing/balance system can be found in some professional divers. The extent of these 
changes varies greatly and has the potential to affects divers´ quality of life. Exact 
knowledge of the mechanisms behind such changes is still limited and suggests further 
research is required. It is therefore necessary to implement preventative measures, 
including health monitoring in future diving.” 
The PSA (2012) report would also seem to suggest that the working conditions of divers 
are not entirely safe. 
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1.1 Objective 
The subject matter of long-term health monitoring of divers seems to be high on the 
agenda in the diving industry, and potential improvements or changes in long-term health 
monitoring and follow up of divers´ health are much discussed. There appears to exist a 
great deal of contradiction with regard to monitoring the long-term health of divers whilst 
at the same time operating within the existing legal boundaries. There also appears to exist 
some debate as to the usefulness of some of the safety measures. Whether these challenges 
can be attributed to the divers themselves, the diving entrepreneurs, operators or regulators 
is a much debated matter within the industry. This study aims to assess the effectiveness of 
safety measures that are in place to prevent or decrease long-term health risks to divers. 
The intent is to provide knowledge that can be used to improve the long-term health 
follow-up of offshore divers as well as further my own understanding of the subject matter. 
In order to achieve this the study attempts to answer to the following question:  
How good are the safety barriers with regard to long-term health monitoring of offshore 
divers? 
In the context of this study, long-term health monitoring refers to the use of measuring 
tools with the purpose of assessing the diver´s health. The outcome of these health 
assessments determines whether the diver is fit to dive, or if further medical 
attention/follow-up is required.  
In order to address the research questions it is necessary to 
 present relevant theories concerning risk management  
 present relevant research literature concerning long-term health risks associated 
with diving 
 examine the roles and responsibilities of the divers, employers, operators and 
regulators in relation to the identified barriers 
 assess the effectiveness of the relevant laws, regulations and standards by 
examining to what degree they are implemented and complied with 
For the purpose of this study any safety measures put in place by divers, diving 
entrepreneurs, operators and regulators to prevent or reduce long-term health risks to 
divers will be defined as safety barriers. 
Introduction 
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There are many different types of barriers, but this study will be limited to non-physical 
barriers and include the following regulations, standards and procedures: 
 Offshore health certificate 
 Health certificate for offshore divers  
 Pre- and post-dive medical checks 
 3-yearly medical examination 
 Annual health screening (questionnaire) 
 Exposure assessment 
Due to time- and geographical constraints, as well as own interests in the subject matter, 
the study will be limited to diving work performed in petroleum related activities 
(hereinafter referred to only as diving) on the NCS, specifically saturation diving, and the 
long-term health risks associated with this type of work. Further, due to data availability 
the study will to an extent be limited to diving work carried out under the management of 
diving entrepreneur 1 (hereinafter referred to as DE1). DE1 has 264 active saturation 
divers, of which 40 are permanently employed. Of the 264, 12 are Norwegian and the 
remainder British. 
 
1.2 Background  
This section will give a short description of what diving is and will include some 
definitions of diving terminology. Further, a short account of the history of petroleum 
related diving on the NCS will be provided, as well as the evolvement of the regulatory 
regime surrounding diving activities. To provide an insight into what possible long-term 
effects divers can experience and which the safety barriers should, in theory, prevent or 
decrease, a short description from selected research findings will be provided.  
 
1.2.1 What is diving? 
Diving is exposure to increased surrounding pressure compared to normal atmospheric 
pressure at a given location. This type of exposure is most commonly associated with 
activities under water, although they can also occur under dry conditions such as for 
example in a pressure chamber or welding habitat. All dives are characterised by three 
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phases: the compression phase, bottom time and the decompression phase. The 
compression phase is the time during which the pressure is adjusted according to the 
relevant depth. So for example if a diver is to work at a depth of 50 metres below the sea 
surface, the compression phase is the time it takes to adjust the atmospheric pressure to that 
depth. Bottom time is the duration spent by the diver at the relevant depth. The 
decompression phase is the time from leaving the working depth until reaching the surface, 
i.e. normal atmospheric pressure (HUH, 2004).  
Hyperbaric diving, which is the focus of this study,  
“…exposes man to ambient pressure at depth. On the surface, the human body is 
subject to a pressure of one atmosphere. When a diver descends in the water, the 
pressure on the body increases by one atmosphere per 10 metres depth. The body´s 
ability to absorb gas increases in proportion with the increase in pressure. This 
means that as the diver descends, the amount of gas his body will absorb will 
depend on how long he his down and how deep he goes. When the diver returns to 
the surface, his rate of return must be adapted to the time required to wash out the 
excess gas. If he returns too quickly, to a lower pressure, the excess gas will be 
liberated too quickly, and the diver will suffer from decompression sickness. 
Surplus gas must be transported to the lungs for ventilation.”  
(Jacobsen et.al, 1984:13-14) 
There are different types of hyperbaric diving, including bounce diving and saturation 
diving. Saturation diving involves the divers entering a chamber system (Figure 1), in 
which the atmospheric pressure is adjusted to that at the relevant working depth. The 
chamber systems may consist of several chambers in which the divers can live, and one or 
two chambers are connected to the diving bell (Figure 2) in a manner that allows the divers 
to move from the chamber to the diving bell (Figure 3), and vice versa, when they are at 
the same saturation level. A diving bell is a chamber for transporting divers between the 
decompression chamber and the workplace. When the divers are to enter the water to work, 
they first enter the diving bell. The saturation level in the chamber and the diving bell are 
isolated, and the bell is lowered into the sea down to the working depth. An umbilical is 
connected to the DSV and supplies the diving bell with gas, hot water, electrical power, 
communication, and control signal (NOU 2003:20-28). 
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Figure 1: Diving chambers (Walters, 2012) 
 
 
Figure 2: Diving bell (Walters, 2012) 
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Figure 3: Connection between diving chamber and diving bell (Walters, 2012) 
 
Once the pressure outside the diving bell is the same as the pressure inside the diving bell 
the bottom hatch can be opened and the divers enter the water. The divers are supplied 
with air from the surface, with a back-up air supply located in the diving bell (Figure 4). 
Once the dive is completed the divers are transferred to the saturation chambers at the 
surface. Here the divers can decompress (NOU 2003:28). Decompression means to return 
to the surface where the ambient pressure is one atmosphere at the end of a dive, or work 
period, from a given depth. As all gas pockets in the body will have the same pressure as 
the surroundings and therefore any pressure drop will result in the gas pockets expanding 
(NOU 2003:36). The time required to wash out surplus gas, the decompression time, 
depends on the depth and duration of the dive. However, after a certain length of time the 
body will become saturated with the gas being breathed, but the decompression time will 
not increase further (Jacobsen et al., 1984:13). 
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Figure 4: Diver´s seat inside diving bell with back-up air supply (Walters, 2012) 
 
Bounce diving is usually carried out using a diving bell and decompression chamber at the 
surface. The dives are usually deep and relatively short in duration (NOU 2003:27).  
 
1.2.2 Historic development of petroleum related diving on the NCS 
When petroleum related diving started out in Norway in 1966 there were initially two types 
of diving being carried out. One was inshore, which was mainly related to the construction 
of platforms. The other was offshore in the North Sea, which was mainly related to 
exploration, pipe laying, trenching, field development and oil- and gas production. There 
were different types of diving methods being used including surface oriented diving, 
bounce diving, and saturation diving. In the 1970s diving bells were used and bounce- and 
saturation diving became the preferred diving methods due to the need for deeper dives, 
longer dives, and for reduced decompression time in the water in order to minimise the 
thermal strains on the diver. From the 1980s saturation diving became the main diving 
method with practically no bounce diving taking place. Practical knowledge regarding 
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deep diving was limited in Norway and so initially the main source of information came 
from foreign parties. The same applied to competence in diving medicine (NOU 2003:51).  
 
Since the start of petroleum related diving on the NCS divers became overrepresented in 
the accident statistics, even after the oil industry as a whole experienced a significant 
improvement in safety. In the 1960s there did not exist any extensive training program for 
the coming offshore divers. Contracts were agreed based more on cost and speed of work 
rather than safety. Diving tables were used as a guideline for how quickly a diver could 
complete a job. Initially the diving tables of the US Navy were used, but later various 
diving companies developed their own, often secret, tables. Tables allowing for more 
diving time had a competitive advantage. The fast expansion of the industry resulted in 
young an inexperienced divers being sent to work without adequate training (Gjerde and 
Ryggvik 2009).  
 
1.2.3 Pioneer divers – lack of regulations 
Gjerde and Ryggvik (2009) state that the Norwegian authorities have been slow in 
establishing effective regulatory systems for the diving industry compared to other 
industries and professions. Immediately after World War II there were approximately 200-
300 professional divers in Norway. No diving school existed and in practice anyone could 
undertake diving work (ibid).  
Up until the 1950s the Navy´s diving regulations were used as a diving manual in Norway. 
The manual stated that a diver should be strong and a competent swimmer. Further it stated 
that if a diver became overweight he should be dismissed. In 1959 a royal Decree stated 
that divers should be between 21 and 40 years of age and have a certificate issued by the 
Labour Inspection Authority (LIA). However there were no requirements with regard to 
what knowledge a diver should have tin order to obtain such a certificate (ibid).  
By 1960 the Navy had significantly improved the training of their divers. However, there 
did not exist any training for the new challenges the pioneer divers faced, nor had any 
significant medical research been carried out with regard to possible long-term health 
effects (ibid).  
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In 1967, safety regulations concerning oil operations in the North Sea were issued in the 
form of a royal Decree (Ryggvik & Smith-Solbakken 1997, as cited in Gjerde and Ryggvik 
2009:126). However, diving was mentioned in only one paragraph: 
“The ministry or those it authorises, shall first be submitted for approval a plan for 
how diving shall be carried out, which equipment shall be used, including which 
safety measures will be implemented to protect the divers´ life and well-being. IF 
the person who shall carry out the diving is not in possession of a valid diving 
certificate, consent must be obtained from the ministry or those it authorises before 
diving can commence. Diving work shall be carried out in a proper manner and 
according to current regulations” 
(Statens Oljeråd, as cited in Gjerde and Ryggvik 2009:126, own translation) 
 Only five weeks later there was a fatal diving accident on Ocean Viking in 1967. After the 
accident a representative from the LIA recommended in a statement to the Ministry of 
Industry (MOI) that  
”for safety reasons the use of a diving bell when diving in open sea, from a standing 
point that is more than 3 metres above sea level, when the dive requires a 
decompression stop, should be imposed.”  
(Smith-Sivertsen 1968, as cited in Gjerde and Ryggvik 2009:125, own translation) 
After receiving this recommendation the MOI sent a letter to all oil companies working on 
the NCS where the recommendation was cited word for word and formulated as being 
mandatory (Dæhlin 1968, as cited in Gjerde and Ryggvik 2009:125). However, this 
provision was easy to work around, and no public inspections were carried out to ensure 
that the decision was complied with in practice. Up until 1971 there was hardly any follow-
up of on-going diving activities by the authorities, and nothing was done to develop 
diving-specific safety regulations (Gjerde and Ryggvik 2009). 
In March 1971, following one of two more diving accidents on Ocean Viking, the 
Directorate of Labour issued ten further provisions, mostly concerned with criteria that 
would indicate that a diver should not dive. However, the provisions did not indicate how 
one should ensure the sound health of divers, or who was responsible doing so. 
Subsequently to the two accidents on Ocean Viking in 1971, the WOI issued more strict 
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requirements with regard to who could issue health certificates for divers, and the MOI 
determined that no divers´ stay on the platforms should exceed one week, and was to be 
followed by one week´s leave onshore (Gjerde and Ryggvik 2009). 
It was not until 1977, when the Work Environment Act (WEA) was implemented in 
Norway, that a decision was made that own diving regulations were to be developed. The 
WEA excluded floating rigs and supply vessels, and it was from these types of installations 
and special vessels that diving activities took place. It was decided that the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate (NPD) would take over the regulatory responsibility for diving and 
on the 1
st
 of July 1978, twelve years since petroleum related diving started on the NCS, 
temporary diving regulations were implemented (Gjerde and Ryggvik 2009). 
 
1.2.4 Long-term health effects 
It is difficult to find one single report that states and verifies all possible long-term health 
effects associated with diving. With regard to many health effects there appears to be a 
lack of consensus. The state-designated commission of inquiry, who in 2002 concluded its 
investigation into the working conditions of pioneer divers in the North Sea, concluded that 
there did not exist reliable data with regard to whether or not diving can result in adverse 
neurological/cognitive long-term effects, or whether deep-diving that is carried out 
correctly can lead to long-lasting or permanent neurological and/or cognitive damages 
(NOU 2003:7). In 1998, after the Minister of Social Affairs offered all pioneer divers a 
medical assessment if it was suspected that there existed a diving-related illness or injury, 
Haukeland University Hospital (HUH) was requested to carry out a study to establish 
which type of diving injuries should qualify one for occupational injury compensation. The 
study, the findings of which were published in 2004, included lung-function examinations, 
neurological-, and neurophysiological examinations, hearing- and balance examinations, 
and neuropsychological examinations (HUH 2004:6). In addition, psychological stress 
reactions were assessed (HUH 2004:110). Although the HUH study concerned pioneer 
divers it will be used in this section to briefly present possible long-term effects of diving 
as identified by the results of the study. 
 
  
Introduction 
 
 12 
Decompression illness (DCI) 
With regard to the central nervous system it is especially decompression illness that can 
result in acute neurological defects with a risk of long-term effects. Diving causes 
decompression stress that can lead to the development of micro gas bubbles locally in 
tissue and in the venous blood circulation. Decompression illness is generally divided into 
two different types. Type I includes symptoms from the musculo-skeletal system, skin and 
lymph, where joint pain or skin bends is most common. Type II includes neurological, 
cardiovascular, audio-vestibular and/or respiratory symptoms (Francis and Mitchell, 2003 as 
cited in HUH 2004:51). 
 
Reduced lung-function 
The study showed that the frequency of symptoms for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 
(COPD), in the form of chronic cough, breathlessness during physical exertion and 
wheezing in the chest, was higher amongst divers compared to the general Norwegian 
population (HUH 2004:48) 
 
Neurophysiological effects  
Neurological effects included self-perceived mental impairment, reduced capacity and 
energy, mental difficulties and neurological symptoms such as chronic pain. Neurological 
examinations of the divers exhibited signs of deterioration in the nervous system and the 
neurological symptoms were significantly higher amongst the divers compared to a control 
group (HUH 2004:69). 
 
Reduced hearing and balance  
As a group, the divers exhibited poorer hearing than expected based on their age. Results 
indicated hearing loss due to noise exposure, among other causes. Also, compared to a 
control group, the divers had poorer balance (HUH 2004:93).  
 
Neuropsychological effects 
The divers exhibited reduced attention, concentration, working memory, 
mental/psychomotor pace, and mental flexibility. They also exhibited more tremor and 
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mild to moderate impairment of tactile perception (HUH 2004:106). 
 
Psychological stress reactions  
The divers in the study exhibited significant mental health problems. Several had been 
exposed to traumatic diving-related events and exhibited mental stress reaction in relation 
to these. Also, several of the divers fulfilled the criteria for posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), commonly associated with increased suicidal tendencies (HUH 2004:116).  
It should be noted the HUH study concerned pioneer divers that worked during a period of 
time when the regulation regime was considerably different from that of today. However, 
the long-term health effects outlined above appear to be relevant to those divers working 
today, and in fact, some of the divers working in the North Sea today were also active 
during the pioneer period.  
 
Health related quality of life 
In 2004, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) released a similar research report in which 
the long-term health impact of diving was investigated (Macdiarmid et al. 2004). This 
study, which compared divers to a age matched Oil and Gas industry offshore workers, 
comprised of 1) an assessment of ”occupational history, general health complaints, 
diagnosed medical conditions and health related quality of life” through the use of a postal 
questionnaire survey; and 2) ”a detailed physiological and neuropsychological 
investigation (clinic study) of a sub-sample of the population who responded to the postal 
questionnaire survey” (Macdiarmid et al. 2004). Like the study carried out by HUH, this 
study also concerned pioneer divers. It was found that complaints of “forgetfulness or loss 
of concentration” was associated with significant impairment of health related quality of 
life. In the study by HUH (2004:6), a large proportion of the divers reported that they had a 
decreased quality of life and that health problems affected their ability to live a full life 
both in relation to their work and free time. Further, many reported that their health 
problems prevented their ability to socialize. 
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1.2.5 Previous research 
There have been numerous studies carried out related to diving medicine. Already 
mentioned above are the two studies concerning the long-term health of pioneer divers 
(HUH 2005 and Macdiarmid et al. 2004). However, with regard to the safety barriers used 
in diving, specifically the non-physical safety barriers, there appears to be limited research 
published. 
In 2010 the National Institute of Occupational Health (NIOH) published a report that 
presented the findings from an assessment of the annual health-screening questionnaire 
intended for saturation and air divers. The study was part of an agreement between the 
NIOH and PSA and concludes that the current health surveillance program, with the pre- 
and post-dive medical checks and the 3-yearly medical examination, “suggests that divers 
are well taken care of” (Skogstad et al. 2010:4). Further the report states the annual 
certificate controls are additional safety factors and that the annual health-screening 
questionnaire is not pertinent (ibid). 
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2 An organisational view on diving safety 
This chapter will present theoretical contributions that will be used to evaluate and 
understand how diving risks are managed, and to assess how good the existing safety 
barriers are. Some of the terminology used in the following chapters, and not already 
covered in the introduction, will also be defined here. 
Risks associated with diving are managed by organisations, be it regulators, diving 
entrepreneurs, or operators. As such, one possible way to assess how good the safety 
barriers are, with regard to preventing or reducing long-term health risks to divers, is to 
view the occurrence of long-term health effects as organisational accidents or failures. 
Much of modern theory regarding organisational accidents is centred on the fact that the 
cause of failure is often organisational rather than due to human error alone. One example 
of this type of thinking comes from James Reason (1997). Some of Reason´s theories will 
be presented in section 2.1 Organisational accidents. Specifically applicable to this study 
is Reason´s “Swiss cheese” model, which will be used to illustrate safety barriers in 
relation to diving.  
Section 2.2 Risk governance will briefly present the concept of risk governance and the 
framework model for risk governance developed by the International Risk Governance 
Council (IRGC). In relation to this study, due in part to the limited scope of the study as 
well as time restrictions, only a few elements from the model have been selected as a 
theoretical framework to help analyse and understand how health related diving risks are 
managed. These include concern assessment; including risk perceptions, social concerns, 
and socio-economic impacts; and communication. 
 
2.1 Organisational accidents 
James Reason´s (1997) book ”Managing the risks of organizational accidents” discusses 
causes of major accidents in high technology systems. This study will use some of the 
principles presented by Reason when examining the way in which the risks to divers are 
managed, in particular long-term health risks. In the context of this study risk is defined as 
the combination of uncertainty and consequence/outcome of a given activity (Aven et.al. 
2004:37). 
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Between hazards and potential losses, lies protection, consisting of layers of safety 
barriers. Reason´s (1997:9) ”Swiss cheese” model of defences is a good illustration of how 
an accident trajectory passes through successive layers of safety barriers through holes 
caused by active failures or latent conditions (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Reason´s (1997) Swiss cheese model 
 
Reason (1997:7) states  
”All defences are designed to have one or more of the following functions: to create 
understanding and awareness of the local hazards; to give clear guidance on how to 
operate safely; to provide alarms and warnings when danger is imminent; to restore 
the system to a safe state in an off-normal situation; to interpose safety barriers 
between the hazards and the potential losses; to contain and eliminate the hazards 
should they escape this barrier; to provide the means of escape and rescue should 
hazard containment fail”  
As mentioned in section 1.1 Objective, any safety measures put in place by divers, diving 
entrepreneurs, operators and regulators to prevent or reduce long-term health risks to 
divers will be defined as safety barriers.  
Reason (1997:8) introduces the terms hard and soft defences. Hard defences include 
technical devices, physical barriers, alarms, and personal protective equipment. Soft 
defences include legislation, regulatory surveillance, procedures, licencing, training, and 
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front-line operators. In relation to diving this study will encompass soft defences including, 
but not limited to, laws and regulations related to diving and diver safety, any internal 
procedures that actors in the industry may have implemented, or any training or certificates 
required by divers. There can be no doubt that hard defences play a key role in protecting 
divers´ health, be it short- or long-term. However, it is the soft defences presented in 
section 1.1 Objective that are currently high on the agenda in the diving industry and that 
will be focused on in this study. 
Reason (1997:10) also introduces the terms active failures and latent conditions, which 
refer to the human contribution to organisational accidents. Active failures are unsafe acts 
committed by front-end operators such as for example pilots or maintenance personnel, 
whilst latent conditions are the reasons behind these unsafe acts. Unsafe acts can be seen as 
a consequence rather than a cause, a consequence of latent conditions (ibid:10). Whilst 
front-end operators commit active failures, latent conditions may originate from the upper 
levels of an organisation “and within related manufacturing, contracting, regulatory and 
governmental agencies” (ibid:11). In relation to diving, active failures could be related to 
for example maintenance of diving equipment such as the diving bell and umbilical, or the 
operation of such equipment. It will be argued later that the divers themselves can in fact 
commit active failures. Latent conditions could be related to for example decisions made 
by the management level in organisations such as the diving entrepreneurs, operators, 
regulators and even unions. The subject of whether there exists active failures and/or latent 
conditions as far as the long-term health risks to divers is concerned, will be revisited in 
chapter 5 Discussion, after findings have been presented in chapter 4 Results. 
 
2.2 Risk governance 
The IRGC (2005:22) state that risk governance ”includes the totality of actors, rules, 
conventions, processes and mechanisms and is concerned with how relevant risk 
information is collected, analysed and communicated, and how management decisions are 
taken”.  
Neye and Donahue (2000) explain that on a national scale ”governance describes structures 
and processes for collective decision making involving governmental and non-
governmental actors” (as cited in Aven and Renn 2010:49). 
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The IRGC (2006:22) have developed a risk governance framework ”to help understand, 
analyse and manage important risk issues”. 
Aven and Renn (2010:53) state that the three traditional categories of ”risk assessment, 
management and communication are not sufficient to analyse and improve the risk 
governance processes” and so the IRGCs framework (Figure 6) also includes a socio-
cultural contexts as well as a risk categorisation component.  
 
Figure 6: IRGC risk governance framework (Aven and Renn 2010:57) 
 
Concern assessment 
The history of the diving industry, with all its´ lack of regulation, injuries, fatalities and 
loss of quality of life for many divers, may not differ significantly from other groups in the 
offshore petroleum industry. Indeed, Smith-Solbakken (1997:119) investigated the 
workplace culture in the offshore oil industry from the 1960s to the 1980s and states that 
the labour culture in the early days of the offshore was grounded in American drilling 
culture where the mentality was to keep working until the job was done, no matter what the 
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cost. As with divers, the oil workers also operated with little or no regulations to protect 
them (ibid:167). However, all the media attention the diving industry has received during 
the last few years, suggests that concern assessment should be included in the governance 
of diving risks, especially related to long-term health effects, be they physical or 
psychological.  
 
Social concerns 
Aven and Renn (2010:93) state there exist many different classification schemes for socio-
economic concerns and present a list with various categories of impacts developed by 
Vanclay (2002). These categories include “Indicative Health and Social Well-being 
Impacts” and “Indicative Family and Community Impacts”. When seen in relation to what 
is known about diving today, these two categories appear to be very relevant. Potential 
negative health effects of diving affects not only the divers themselves, but also their 
families and friends. In the study of pioneer-divers´ health status conducted by HUH 
(2004:6), a large proportion of the divers reported that they had a decreased quality of life 
and that health problems affected their ability to live a full life both in relation to their 
work and free time. Further, many reported that their health problems prevented their 
ability to socialise.  
 
Risk communication and risk perception 
Aven and Renn (2010:159) state “good practices in risk communication are meant to help 
all affected parties to make informed choices about matters of concern to them”. When 
dealing with uncertain or ambiguous risk problems, which are certainly how long-term 
health risks to divers can be described, it is important to consider data not only on physical 
consequences, but also data on secondary impacts (ibid:94). This can include social 
impacts and insights into risk perception (ibid). People´s perception of risk is subjective 
and related to how information concerning a risk source is communicated. Further, Aven 
and Renn (2010:159) state “risks pertaining to complex health threats (…) are difficult to 
communicate because they are usually effective only over a longer time period”. Research 
on accident risk judgements among offshore workers has found that level of safety culture 
significantly influence the outcome (Adie et al. 2005:144). Divers have been found to 
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place less importance on good safety culture in reducing accident risk (ibid). Aven and 
Renn (2010:163) list “addressing different subcultures in society” as a major problem of 
risk communication and state that characterising the audience according to cultural beliefs 
is of great assistance. Divers´ risk perception may affect their willingness to undergo 
medical examination as well as the way they work, something that will be discussed 
further in chapter 5 Discussion.  
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3 Research method 
In order to answer the research question presented in section 1.1 Objective, primary data 
was collected and analysed in light of relevant theory presented in chapter 2 Theory. This 
chapter will present information regarding research design, selection criteria, data 
collection method, method for analysis, and validity and reliability. 
3.1 Research design 
The research design was to a certain extent based on Blaikie´s (2009) core elements of a 
social research design. Figure 7 below illustrates how the research design incorporated 
Blaikie´s core elements, albeit it a simplified version.  
Upon determining the research topic for this study a literature search was carried out in 
order to find previous research related to the same topic. Databases used for the literature 
search were Scopus, Academic Search Elite and ScienceDirect. Key words used included 
“diving”, “health”, “long-term”, “barrier”, “offshore”, and “saturation”. The searches 
yielded limited results for research in the same topic area, but some relevant sources were 
found within diving medicine, offshore safety culture, and barrier categorisations. These 
have been used throughout this thesis to support context and findings. 
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Figure 7: Research design, adapted from Blaikie (2009) 
 
Topic/problem 
•Long-term health follow-up of divers 
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•How good are the safety barriers? 
•Evaluation 
•Non-physical safety barriers 
Research strategies 
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•Active failures 
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•Risk communication 
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•Personal communication 
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•Authorities 
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•PSA 
•Operator 
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•Divers 
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•Cross-sectional 
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3.2 Selection criteria 
In order to assess the effectiveness of the safety barriers listed in section 1.1 Objective it 
was necessary to interview key persons from the industry (Appendix A). The interview 
candidates fell under the category informants, who, according to Jacobsen (2005:171) have 
good knowledge of the phenomenon being studied. The goal was to find out to what degree 
the said safety barriers are implemented and complied with, as well as identify any 
associated challenges.  
The PSA is “the regulatory authority for technical and operational safety, including 
emergency preparedness, and for the working environment” (www.ptil.no), and so it 
seemed prudent to interview a representative from there. A representative from a group 
within the organisation that has in-depth knowledge about the subject area was available to 
be interviewed. 
DE1 is a subsea entrepreneur that employs divers both in permanent and contract positions 
Key informants within the organisation´s health department and diving management 
department were identified and approached. One representative from each of these 
departments agreed to participate in interviews. 
Interviews with divers were essential in order to ascertain how the safety barriers 
functioned in practice, and further to use this information in assessing their effectiveness. 
Contact information for divers registered in DE1´s database is restricted to specific 
personnel. The relevant employee was contacted with a request to send out emails on 
behalf of the author, requesting divers to participate in interviews (Appendix B). Divers 
who wished to participate responded to the author by email. The divers selected to 
participate had to meet all of the following criteria: 
 Carried out diving work for DE1 
 Carried out diving work post 2009 
 Carried out diving work on the NCS 
Selecting divers who had worked on the NCS post 2009 was based on the fact that the 
annual health-screening questionnaire was implemented in 2009. In total, eight divers were 
interviewed. 
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Relevant information was also obtained through personal communications with an 
approved diving doctor (approved by HA), as well as a representative from two of the 
largest operators on the NCS (hereinafter referred to as Operator 1 and Operator 2). 
 
3.3 Data collection  
Qualitative interviews with informants allow the researcher to “get close to the social 
actors´ meanings and interpretations, to their accounts of the social interaction in which 
they have been involved” (Blaikie 2009:207).  
Some of the interviews were carried out in a specific order and interview questions were 
often based on information obtained in the preceding interview. The interviews were all 
individual, open interviews, which according to Jacobsen (2005:142) are best suited when 
relatively few units are being studied and when one is interested in what each individual 
says. After having identified and approached interview candidates, interviews were first 
held with key-informants from DE1 in order to ascertain to what extent they complied with 
the laws and regulations previously identified, as well as any major challenges they might 
be experiencing. The information obtained from these was followed up in interviews with 
key informants from the PSA. After having obtained information from the PSA and DE1, 
the divers were interviewed. Having identified specific challenges that related directly to 
the divers in the previous interviews, some of the questions posed to the divers were a 
direct result of this. Eight divers were interviewed, three of whom were employed, and five 
who were self-employed. The average age of the divers was 45 and the average number of 
years working as offshore saturation divers was 19 years. 
The divers were interviewed regarding their participation, or non-participation, in the 
voluntary 3-yearly medical examination and the annual health-screening questionnaire. 
Reasons for participation or non-participation were also discussed, as well as their thoughts 
regarding the effectiveness, or usefulness, of existing barriers. 
All interviews were prepared with Kvale´s (2009:26) “ethical questions at the start of an 
interview study” in mind. Having learned in the early stages of the research design that 
divers are often reluctant to participate in studies or surveys it was of significant 
importance that all communication was thought through and planned carefully. During the 
initial communication with divers that were potential interview candidates, the purpose of 
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the study was made very clear as well as the fact that anonymity was an option available to 
them. In being very open with the divers about the purpose of the study and informing 
them of the anonymity option it was hoped that the reliability of the information obtained 
would be strengthened. This is discussed further below in owa 3.6 Validity and reliability. 
All interviews, both of divers and other key informants from the industry, were of a semi-
structured nature in line with Jacobsen´s (2005) definition of an open interview. That is to 
say, an interview guide was prepared beforehand with a few main questions, but follow-up 
questions were added ad hoc during the interview process. The interview guide was made 
available to those who wished it beforehand (Appendix C).  
With regard to the diving doctor and the operators, information was not obtained via 
interviews, but rather through personal communication either via telephone, email, or both.  
All interview candidates that participated in this study gave informed consent. Information 
regarding the background, design and intent of the study was given to the interviewees 
either verbally or via email prior to the interviews. Interviews were transcribed in their 
entirety and deleted upon completion of the thesis. Any requests for anonymity were 
respected.  
 
3.4 Data analysis 
Data was, as mentioned, obtained through interviews with informants as well as through 
personal communications to a small degree. The next step was to structure and simplify in 
order to get an overview of the findings. By compiling different interviews one can point 
out patterns or underlying causes (Jacobsen 2005:185). The purpose of a qualitative 
analysis is to point out the core details that can provide new insight into a situation or 
phenomena (ibid).  
The data analysis phase followed the steps presented by Jacobsen (2005) as far as was 
possible. The first step was to describe. Most of the interviews were recorded, and for 
those that were not, extensive notes had been taken. The recorded interviews were 
transcribed in their entirety into electronic documents, as were those that were recorded by 
hand. The second step involved systemising and categorising the data (figure 8). The data 
was first categorised according to which safety barrier it related to, i.e. offshore health 
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certificate, health certificate for offshore divers, pre- and post-dive medical checks, 3-
yearly medical examination, annual health screening questionnaire, and exposure 
assessment. This was followed by second level categories according interviewees, i.e. the 
authorities, the operator, the diving entrepreneur, and the divers.  
 
Figure 8: Systemisation and categorisation of data 
 
Organising the data in this manner aided the process of identifying recurring themes, for 
example challenges with a particular safety barrier, and also identifying the various points 
of view on specific safety barriers. This was essential in order to make a qualitative 
assessment regarding the effectiveness of the safety barriers. As a third step these findings 
were then discussed using relevant theories and previous research as reference points. 
 
3.5 Validity and reliability 
As pointed out by Jacobsen (2005) the challenge with a qualitative approach is that it is 
resource-intensive. Interviews can be very time consuming, especially with regard to 
transcription and administration. Jacobsen (2005) explains that open individual interviews 
Research method 
 
 27 
are best suited when a) relatively few units are studied; b) when individual statements are 
of interest; c) and when individual´s interpretation of a certain phenomenon is of interest. 
One dilemma in this study was the choice between a closed interview with set answer 
alternatives in a set order, or even a questionnaire, versus an open interview where one can 
pose follow-up questions and really dig to get information. The latter type of interview, 
which was used in this study can give a wealth of information and can really get at the 
individual´s attitudes and perceptions, which was deemed very important with regard to the 
divers especially, and in order to address my main research question. However, the number 
of interviews that can be carried out becomes limited due to time restrictions, and with few 
respondents the validity of the results can come into question. Part of the challenge and 
reason for choosing open individual interviews was 1) sourcing divers that had worked on 
the NCS and/or the BCS since 2009, which is when the annual medical screening 
questionnaire was implemented in the industry; and 2) getting divers to participate in 
interviews. Jacobsen (2005:216)) states that one method of validating is to critically go 
through sources and information from sources. Here the purpose is to 1) assess whether the 
correct informants have been interviewed, and whether they have conveyed truthful 
information; and 2) to critically evaluate whether the categorisation in the analysis 
(discussion) phase reflects the data obtained and whether the context and explanations 
given reflect reality. The study was submitted to a health and safety advisor from DE1 with 
in depth knowledge about diving activities and diving health. This person’s contribution 
was to test the validity of the findings in this study, and critical assessment according to 
Jacobsen´s method mentioned above.  
The reliability of a qualitative study can be affected by interview technique. Jacobsen 
(2005:225-226) states that the researcher affects interviewees at the same time as the 
researcher is affected by the relationships that occur during the data collection phase. The 
person being interviewed is affected for example by the researcher´s body language, 
clothing, or the way he or she talks (ibid). The interview context can also affect the results. 
For example whether the location of the interview is artificial or natural can play an 
important part. The key concern with regard to obtaining reliable data in this study was in 
connection with the divers. As mentioned in section 3.3 Data collection, communication 
with the divers was open and they were made fully aware that they could remain 
anonymous should they wish. This was emphasized in order that the information they gave 
should be truthful. Also, due to the geographical location of some of the divers, it was not 
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possible to interview all of them in person. In these cases interviews were conducted via 
telephone at a date and time that suited the divers. This allowed the divers to be in their 
natural settings, unaffected by many of the factors that may have played an adverse part 
had the interviews been conducted in person, what Jacobsen (2005:226) refers to an 
interviewer-effect. On the other hand, the divers who were interviewed in person may have 
been affected both by the interviewer and the settings, as these divers were interviewed in 
an office. That is to say they were interviewed in an unnatural setting. One diver was 
interviewed whilst inside a saturation chamber on board a DSV. The saturation chamber is 
under constant monitoring of diving support personnel and so it is not unlikely that this 
may have affected the diver´s willingness to speak freely when answering the interview 
questions. 
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4 Results 
This chapter will present the main findings from the study. First, each barrier will be 
presented along with a short description of the regulatory framework and/or standard 
where applicable. Second, data obtained from primary sources, i.e. interviews with 
informants, is presented along with data obtained from secondary sources where relevant.  
 
4.1 Safety barriers 
4.1.1 Offshore health certificate 
All potential offshore divers must undergo a health check before being allowed to 
commence diver training. Further, a yearly health check must be undertaken to confirm 
that the divers health is satisfactory. 
Requirement Regulation/standard Reference 
Offshore health 
certificate (valid for 2-
year period) 
FOR 2010-12-20 nr 1780: Health 
requirements for person working on 
offshore installations in the 
petroleum industry (regulations)  
(own translation)  
www.lovdata.no (a) 
 
Although not directly related to diving this regulation applies to anyone working on 
offshore installations. The regulations outlined health criteria that must be fulfilled in order 
to obtain a valid offshore health certificate. § 11 lists specific health requirements, and § 12 
states that for persons who are to work under increased atmospheric pressure the health 
requirements outlined by the Directorate Of Health (DOH) also apply. Should a diver fail 
the required health criteria required to work on offshore installations it would naturally 
follow that the diver may not carry out offshore diving activities. The informants 
interviewed had no specific comments regarding the effectiveness of this barrier. However, 
the diving doctor (informant 13) states that the medical check required for the offshore 
health certificate is not designed to uncover long-term health effects from diving and as 
such is not an effective barrier for this.   
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4.1.2 Health certificate for offshore divers 
Requirement Regulation/standard Reference 
Health certificate for 
offshore divers 
FOR 2010-12-20 nr 1780: Health 
requirements for person working on 
offshore installations in the 
petroleum industry (regulation)  
(own translation)  
§ 11, § 12 
www.lovdata.no (a) 
NORSOK U-100 
§5.1.3 
Standards Norway, 
2009 
 
The health certificate for offshore divers is pursuant to the same regulation as the offshore 
health certificate. The NORSOK U-100 is a standard that was developed by the Norwegian 
petroleum industry. Its purpose is to ensure an adequate level of safety, value adding and 
cost effectiveness for developments and operations in the industry. The standard states that 
divers must hold medical certificates as required by national regulations (Standards 
Norway, 2009). 
Findings from informants were as follows: 
Divers 
Informant 5 (2012) states the medical examination is not particularly testing and is “easy to 
get through”. Informant 11 states the medical examination is not very in-depth and that it 
used to be better some years ago when the examination included x-rays and 
electrocardiography (ECG). The informant further states that private healthcare offers a 
more thorough medical examination. 
Informant 9 states “it is quite thorough and because you know you´ve got it each year you 
have to keep a level of fitness up so you can pass that medical”. However, informant 9 
states further that the quality, or thoroughness, of these medicals varies with different 
doctors. 
Informant 10 states the HSE diving medicals are very good with regard to monitoring, 
particularly if the same doctor is used over a number of years. However, informant 10 also 
states that there is certain conditions a diver can hide from a medical examiner so as to not 
loose their health certificate. 
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4.1.3 Pre- and post dive medical checks 
Requirement Regulation/standard Reference 
Pre- and post-dive 
medical checks 
LOV-2005-06-17-62 Work 
Environment Act 
§ 3-1, § 10-11 
www.lovdata.no (c) 
FOR-2010-04-29-613 Activities 
regulations 
§ 6 
www.lovdata.no (b) 
NORSOK U-100 
§ 5.1.4 
Standards Norway, 
2009 
 
The requirement for pre- and post-dive medical checks is pursuant to the WEA § 3-1, 
which concerns the systematic HSE work and specifically states that employers shall 
survey hazards and problems, consider the risk factors within the organisation, and take 
measures to reduce risk. It is also stated that the employer shall ensure continued 
monitoring of the working environment and the health of employees when the risk factors 
warrants it. Further, § 10-11 in the WEA states that employers who mainly work at night 
shall be offered a health check before commencement and on a regular basis thereafter. 
The requirement is also pursuant to the Activities regulations § 6, which concerns 
monitoring of employees´ health. These regulations state that employers shall ensure 
employees are offered a health check before they commence work that may involve special 
health risks so that preventative measures can be taken. It is also stated that employers 
exposed to hazardous work environment shall be offered a health check if they are still 
employed so that any potential corrective measure may be taken. In addition, the 
requirement is in compliance with NORSOK U-100 § 5.1.4. This paragraph, concerning 
short and long-term health monitoring, states “pre- and post-dive medical checks, in 
accordance with procedures approved by the responsible diving doctor, shall be conducted 
routinely for all divers” (Standards Norway, 2009:17). 
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Findings from informants were as follows: 
Divers 
Informant 9 states the pre- and post-dive medical checks only check the minimum 
requirements for being able to dive, and does not believe these barriers do anything with 
regard to long-term health.  
Contrary to this, informant 8 states 
“Certainly the pre-dive is fine because if there was a problem and the medic had 
picked that up and stopped you from going to sat then that´s an obvious barrier. 
(…) If there was something wrong on the post dive one, or marginally wrong, it 
wouldn´t preclude you from going home and self-medicating or going to a doctor 
yourself. So long as you pass the pre one for the next job then everything is back in 
place.” 
 
4.1.4 3-yearly medical examination 
Voluntary (for diver) Regulation/standard Reference 
3-yearly medical 
examination 
LOV-2005-06-17-62 Work 
Environment Act 
§ 3-1, § 10-11 
www.lovdata.no (c) 
FOR-2010-04-29-613 Activities 
regulations 
§ 6 
www.lovdata.no (b) 
NORSOK U-100 
§ 5.1.4 
Standards Norway, 
2009 
 
The WEA § 3-1 and § 10-11, and the Activities regulations § 6 both apply and are detailed 
under the pre- and post-dive medical checks above. Further, § 6 in the Activities 
regulations states that employers shall ensure that employees are offered regular health 
checks to uncover long-term effects of work environment factors. NORSOK U-100 § 5.1.4 
specifies that “special attention shall be paid to long-term health monitoring of organ 
systems known to be affected by diving” (Standards Norway, 2009:17) and goes on to 
specify which organ system shall be monitored as a minimum.  
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Findings from informants were as follows: 
PSA 
The 3-yearly medical examination is offered to divers, but participation is voluntary. 
Informant 3 from the PSA states that although there exists a legal requirement to offer 
regular health checks pursuant to the regulations mentioned, the method employed is up to 
the employer. 
 
Operators 
Operator 1 has put forward a requirement to DE1 in relation to manned underwater 
operations (MUO) stating that they “will only accept divers participating in the established 
long-term health monitoring system” and that “results and trends from the long-term health 
monitoring system shall actively be used to prevent work related illnesses and injuries”. 
Informant 15 from Operator 1 states the motivation for putting forth such a requirement is 
related to the fact that it is challenging for an operator to carry out long-term health follow 
up of divers over a long period of time due to the participation being voluntary and that 
many divers are not permanently employed. The contractual requirement incorporates both 
the 3-yearly medical examination and the annual health-screening certificate (presented in 
the next section). Operator 1 believes long-term health follow up is a positive safety factor 
for each individual diver (informant 15).  
 
Operator 2 holds a frame contract with diving entrepreneur 2 (hereinafter referred to as 
DE2) for offshore diving services on the NCS. The contract includes statement of 
employment according to the WEA for diving personnel. It also requires that DE2 shall 
employ a sufficient amount of divers and surface personnel as a part of the company’s 
contingency for pipeline repair (informant 12).  
 
Diving entrepreneur 
Informant 2 from DE1, states that the 3-yearly medical examination is offered to divers 
pursuant to the WEA. By offering a 3-yearly medical examination, the company is in 
compliance with NORSOK U-100 in addition to the regulatory requirements. Paragraph 
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5.1.4 of the standard states “examinations shall be repeated at regular interval not 
exceeding three years” (Standards Norway, 2009:17).  
To date approximately 300 divers have participated in the 3-yearly medical examination, 
and some of these have been followed up for as long as 15 years. That is to say that some 
divers have participated in five 3-yearly medical examinations (Informant 2).  
 
Divers 
Of the eight divers interviewed, four had not participated. 
Reasons for non-participation: 
 Suspicion (informant 4) 
 Not aware (informant 5) 
 Not been offered (informant 9 and 11) 
Based on the information from the divers reasons for non-participation was due to 
suspicion, not being aware of the program, and not having been invited to participate. 
According to the diving doctor used by DE1, these 3-yearly medicals occur on quite an ad 
hoc basis. That is, when the diving doctor receives a request from DE1 to carry out these 
medicals, he will either perform them himself or enlist one of his colleagues to do so. 
However, sometimes the requests are submitted with little notice and may not be carried 
out. Most of the 3-yearly medicals performed by the diving doctor and his colleagues to 
date have been in connection with mobilisations in Norway, and most often the medicals 
are conducted on board the vessel or at a location near by (Informant 13). 
Informant 8 states that “there will be a lot of guys that will want to hide information” as a 
reason for divers not wanting to participate in voluntary monitoring programs. This 
statement is supported by informant 4 who states: 
“…the suspicion of health check-ups is that we´re self-employed (…) volunteering 
to do a health check-up can be beneficial for you, but it can be financially costly 
because if something does come up (…) your medical is taken away from you, and 
you´re out of work (…) people try to guard their medical very carefully (…) it has 
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been known for guys not to say certain things because they know that if they say 
that could be their medical gone for 6 months or permanently”  
Reasons for participation: 
 Proactive long-term health research is a good thing and worth participating in 
(informant 5) 
 Long-term research has led to better understanding of long-term pressurisation 
effects (informant 6) 
 Giving back the industry for the benefit of new divers (informant 8) 
 Told to participate, no choice given (informant 10) 
Informant 10 states that although he had participated in 3-yearly medicals whilst on board 
vessels in Norway, at the time there had not seemed to be a choice in the matter. The divers 
were simply told to go and see the Norwegian medic who came on board. He and others 
were of the impression that this was something they had to do. Informant 10 consequently 
received letters after the medical examination informing that the program was in fact 
voluntary, but states “…like a lot of these things, we´ve been told to get involved without 
much choice, we´ve just been told to go and do it”. 
 
4.1.5 Annual health screening (questionnaire) 
Voluntary (for diver) Regulation/standard Reference 
Annual health screening 
(questionnaire) 
LOV-2005-06-17-62 Work 
Environment Act 
§ 3-1, § 10-11 
www.lovdata.no (c) 
FOR-2010-04-29-613 Activities 
regulations 
§ 6 
www.lovdata.no (b) 
NORSOK U-100 
§ 5.1.4 
Standards Norway, 
2009 
 
The annual health-screening questionnaire is an additional method used to comply with the 
same regulations and standard as for the 3-yearly medical examination. Again, 
participation is optional.  
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Informant 2 states that the annual health-screening questionnaire for divers was 
implemented in diving entrepreneur 3 (hereinafter referred to as DE3) and diving 
entrepreneur 4 (hereinafter referred to as DE4) (pre merger in 2010, when the two 
companies became DE1) in 2009. The questionnaire is designed in a manner that the data 
collected can be split in two parts, one part containing the name and birth date of the diver, 
available only to the company health personnel, and a second part containing an individual 
diver reference number (Appendix D). The intended use of the latter is to be able to look 
for any trends that may warrant action on behalf of the divers as a whole, whilst the first 
part, containing the divers personal details, allows for individuals to be followed up as 
required with regard to any health risks (Informant 1). 
 
Findings from informants were as follows: 
PSA 
Informant 3 states the process was initiated by NOPEF (previously Norwegian Oil and 
Petrochemical Union, later merged with Chemical Union and now known as Industri 
Energi) in 2002 and was originally geared towards employment terms. Permanent 
employment was the main goal, but the process led to other positive things. Informant 3 
further states that the participation rate in the annual health-screening questionnaire is low 
due to distrust, which is in line with the attitude of the unions. The divers fear for their own 
job security and it is beneath them to participate until they can see some benefits to 
themselves in doing so. Informant 3 also states that, in his subjective opinion, the divers 
will avoid participation until it is no longer possible to do so. The divers think the 
information given in the questionnaires can be used against them and at the same time they 
are not interested in permanent employment. They don´t want to know until it is too late. 
 
Diving entrepreneur 
The questionnaire is sent out to divers every year and is the company´s way of maintaining 
long-term health follow-up including the 3-yearly medical examination (Informant 2).  
Both informant 1 and 2 state that there is a low response rate to the questionnaires. In 2009 
and 2010 DE3 obtained a response rate of 10% and 10.4% respectively. No questionnaires 
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were sent out in 2011. In 2010 and 2010 DE4 obtained a response rate of 23% and 11.6% 
respectively. No questionnaire was sent out in 2009 (ibid) Further, they attribute low 
response rate partly to trade unions, specifically SAFE and RMT, as well as sceptical 
divers. The RMT and divers are afraid that employers will use the information against 
them (informant 2). Informant 1 states the trade union SAFE is opposed to the health 
follow-up program. SAFE do not want their members to participate as they are of the 
opinion that such a program must be completely anonymous as they believe the 
information provided will be abused. Informant 1 argues that if the program were to be 
completely anonymous one would only be able to look for general trends and not be able to 
provide the individual follow-up that each individual diver is entitled to. Further, Informant 
1 states the alternative is to offer each offshore employee, as SAFE represent not only 
divers, individual sessions with a doctor, something that would be extremely costly. 
Informant 1 also attributes the low response rate partly to the fact that divers are 
particularly “closed off” outside of work.  
“They spend up to 3 weeks in saturation, living and dealing almost only with 2 
colleagues in saturation with them. When they exit saturation they want nothing to 
do with work and are hard to reach and communicate with on work matters.” 
(Informant 1) 
Informant 2 states the system is voluntary, based on legislation, comes before any demands 
made by contractors, and that it is not possible to force divers to participate. Further, 
Informant 2 states demanding participation would not help and would only make it more 
difficult to get the right people for the job.  
“Divers will oppose if participation becomes a forced requirement rather than 
voluntary. With regard to the Operator 1´s contractual demand, we require 60 
hyperbaric welders over the next three years. Three vessels will be working 
simultaneously and the welders are critical personnel that are difficult to find. We 
will train them and recommend that they participate in the yearly follow-up 
program. In fact, their employment contracts will require that they participate in the 
program. This is a bit on the “edge” according to the legislation and NORSOK U-
100 §5.1.4”.  
(Informant 2)  
Results 
 
 38 
Divers 
Of the eight divers interviewed, four had not participated. Out of these four, only one had 
not participated in the 3-yearly medical examination. All divers, whether they had 
participated in the annual health screening questionnaire or not, were asked to comment on 
the low response rate. 
Reasons for non-participation: 
 Suspicion (informant 4 and 11) 
 Apathy (informant 8) 
 Not received questionnaire (informant 8 and 10) 
“[Suspicion] It is a strong word, but I have worked in the industry at times when 
people have not been open or friendly and we have been treated like shit. There is 
an ingrained suspicion, although probably unfounded now (…) if you´ve not given 
any information then it can´t be used against you”  
(Informant 4) 
“…are they trying to find something, and 20 years down the line, when you do put 
in a claim, they can turn around and show you that questionnaire that you filled out 
20 years previous and they can use that against you?” 
(Informant 11) 
 
4.1.6 Exposure assessment 
Requirement Regulation/standard Reference 
Exposure assessment LOV-2005-06-17-62 Work 
Environment Act 
§ 3-1 
www.lovdata.no (c) 
FOR-2010-04-29-613 Activities 
regulations 
§ 41 
www.lovdata.no (b) 
NORSOK U-100 
§ 5.1.4 
Standards Norway, 
2009 
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The requirement for exposure assessment is pursuant to the WEA § 3-1 concerning 
surveying of hazards and problems, considering the risk factors within the organisation, 
and taking measures to reduce risk. The requirement is also pursuant to the Activities 
regulations § 41, which concerns risk information when performing work tasks. It states 
that it shall be ensured employees are given information about health risks and accident 
risks in relation to the work tasks that are to be performed. Further, it is stated “the results 
of assessments, analyses, measurements, surveys of causes for work related illnesses, 
accident investigations and events leading to accidents, and the significance of these results 
in relation to work tasks, shall be made available” (own translation). The requirement is 
also in compliance with NORSOK U-100 § 5.1.4, which states: 
 
“When following up the individual diver’s health, diving exposure data is an 
important parameter. The contractor shall therefore maintain a system to collect and 
store such data in a manner enhancing a prompt retrieval of each individual diver’s 
exposure data. The contractor shall further contractually require that the individual 
diver make available to the health service (in the form of a self-declaration) all 
diving exposure data, including data from diving taking place outside the confines 
of employment/appointment with the contractor.” 
 
Findings from informants were as follows: 
Diving entrepreneur 
In light of NORSOK-U100 § 5.1.4, the PSA wanted a firmer regime for the health follow-
up of divers, a regime that included diving exposure data. DE3 has had such an exposure 
database for more than ten years. During a joint venture period (1995-2006), those diving 
activities that were carried out on DE3 vessels were recorded in their exposure database. 
Although DE4 has not previously had such a database, all diving logs have been kept/filed. 
Now that these two companies have merged (merged company is DE1), all diving 
activities will be logged in the DE3 exposure database. This type of data must be seen 
together with medical check ups in the shape of the health-screening questionnaire 
(informant 2).
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4.2 Comments from diving doctor 
A diving doctor (informant 13) was asked to comment on the effectiveness of the 
abovementioned barriers with regard to uncovering long-term health effects from diving, 
and in light of most recent research findings on the subject. The informant states as 
follows: 
 The offshore health certificate and the health certificate for offshore divers are not 
designed to uncover long-term health effects from diving and as such are not an 
effective barrier for this.  
 The pre-dive medical check is rated as an inefficient barrier as it is designed to 
uncover acute illnesses or injuries that can indicate the diver is not medically fit to 
dive rather than long-term health effects. Similarly the post-dive medical check is 
designed to uncover any health finding related to the relevant diving period.  
 The 3-yearly medical examination is specifically designed to uncover long-term 
health effects and is therefore an effective barrier.  
 The annual health-screening questionnaire can to some extent uncover long-term 
health effects, but most often with diving, a medical examination is required in 
conjunction with a self-declaration/health questionnaire in order to uncover both 
subjective complaints and objective findings. 
 The exposure assessment is not relevant to uncover health effects, specifically 
organ function. However, it is necessary for long-term monitoring as on a group 
level as there is a correlation between exposure and health effects. 
 
4.3 Comments concerning the safety barriers as a whole 
 Well maintained health monitoring (informant 3) 
Informant 3 states health monitoring of divers is well maintained overall. The challenge is 
the low response rate in the annual screening questionnaire. However, Informant 3 states 
that it is still at an early stage and needs time. The PSA are reasonably satisfied with the 
method. 
According to Informant 3 the PSA see no reason to demand a change. However, with 
reference to RUG (risk exposed groups) reports, doctors maintain that it is difficult to 
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follow-up individual divers when they are not employed. It would be more purposeful if 
they all were employed, but there are no legal grounds to force permanent employment 
(ibid). 
 
4.4 Potential improvements 
Informant 1 states that by law, no employee can be forced to participate in the health 
follow-up program, but that if DE1 were more adamant and entered participation in the 
health follow-up program as a requirement in the diver contract, it would in the 
informant´s opinion work. 
Informant 2 talks of another approach for increasing the response rate to the annual health 
screening questionnaire and states that it must be explained to the unions and divers why 
the annual health screening program has been implemented. “We have to build up trust and 
confidence with the divers, convince them that it is only the company health department 
that will use the data and only for the good of the divers” (ibid, own translation). Informant 
2 further states “adult” education is required; “we have to explain the background for doing 
this” (own translation). 
 
4.5 Further measures taken by divers 
 Regular exercise (informant 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 11) 
 Own water supply during bell-run (informant 4 and 9) 
Informant 4 stated that British regulation is not as good as the Norwegian legislation and 
that most divers would like to go along with the Norwegian legislation due to it being more 
strict. This was illustrated with an example:  
“Normally you do a 6-hour bell run. In Norway you have to have a break after 3 
hours to have a drink and food as well if you like. In the UK you can have a break, 
but no one asks to go for a break, nobody wants to be noticed for not being as 
productive as everyone else. (…) I received information about diving and 
dehydration (…) and it is very detrimental to your health to be dehydrated. Many 
divers who have worked in Norway were surprised at the difference having a 
drinking break makes. You feel much better.” (Informant 4) 
Results 
 
 42 
4.6 Additional noteworthy findings 
“If people thought there was life after diving it would make a difference in taking part in 
the surveys” (informant 4. Many divers have no other qualifications/education other than 
the diver training (Informant 4), and so have nothing to “fall back” on should their diving 
career come to an end. 
Many of the divers commented that the regulations encompassing diving were more 
stringent on the NCS compared to the BCS. There were two god examples of this. The first 
concerns a bell run, which is the duration of time from going from the diving chamber into 
the diving bell, being lowered down to a certain depth in order to carry out work, and 
finally being raised back up and going from the diving bell into the diving chamber. On 
both the NCS and the BCS the maximum bell-run is six hours. However, Norwegian 
regulations state that there shall be a mandatory water break after 3 hours, whereas UK 
regulations state that there shall be an optional break after three hours. When working on 
the BCS divers rarely request this optional break because “nobody wants to be noticed for 
not being as productive as everyone else” (informant 4). The second example concerns the 
“blow-down” speed. This is the rate at which the divers are compressed to the atmospheric 
pressure at which they will be working. On the NCS the maximum compression rate is one 
metre per minutes (in a main chamber), whereas on the BCS the rate can be as fast as 18 
metres per minute (in a diving bell or entry lock) “which is far too fast because if you´re 
going over 100 metres you don´t just feel it physically, you feel it mentally as well” 
(informant 6).  
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5 Discussion 
In this chapter the results from the study will be discussed using the theoretical framework 
presented in chapter 2 Theory. The results obtained through interviews with key informants 
will be discussed with focus on the effectiveness of barriers. In light of the results obtained 
it is specifically the optional 3-yearly medical examination and the annual health-screening 
questionnaire that will be discussed. Some of the compulsory regulatory requirements will 
be included to a certain extent. In total eight divers were interviewed and therefore the 
results cannot be generalised as such. However, it is safe to assume that many divers will 
be able to relate to various opinions and statements presented. 
The discussion will as far as possible be presented using the same thematic order as 
chapter 4 Results. Initially, a short summary of the main findings will be presented and 
discussed in light of relevant theory. 
 
5.1 The safety barriers 
In short, the only barriers specifically concerned with long-term health monitoring of 
divers are, according to informant 13, the 
 3-yearly medical examination; 
 annual health screening questionnaire; 
 and the exposure assessment 
Only with the latter is participation obligatory, regulated by law. By using this information 
and applying it to Reason´s (1997:9) “Swiss cheese” model, it can be seen that the 
effectiveness of these three safety barriers is dependent upon the participation of the 
divers: 
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Figure 9: Safety barriers for long-term health monitoring 
 
Figure 9 illustrates the three layers of defences an accident trajectory would have to pass 
through to results in an undesired incident, which in this case would be long-term health 
effects to the diver. However, as the 3-yearly medical examination and the health-
screening questionnaire are both voluntary, i.e. divers may choose not to participate, the 
model could in fact look very different: 
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Figure 10: Compulsory safety barriers for long-term health monitoring 
 
In figure 10 it can be seen that the two voluntary safety barriers, the 3-yearly medical 
examination and the annual health screening questionnaire, have been removed. This is, in 
effect, how the accident trajectory would look should a diver choose not to participate. In 
fact, according to informant 13, the exposure assessment safety barrier does not uncover 
health effects, but rather it is necessary for long-term monitoring on a group level due to 
the correlation between exposure and health effects. This leaves us with an alarming 
picture: Is the long-term health monitoring of a diver solely dependent on voluntary 
participation and coincidences?  
 
5.2 3-yearly medical examination 
As NORSOK U-100 § 5.1.4 (Standards Norway 2009) specifies  
“Special attention shall be paid to long-term health monitoring of organ systems 
known to be affected by diving (…) Examinations shall be repeated at regular 
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intervals not exceeding three years, using accepted methods”. 
Informant 2 states divers working for the company are offered 3-yearly medical 
examinations and that the organisation is in compliance with WEA and NORSOK U-100 
Standard. However, informant 13 states that these medical examinations take place on 
quite an ad hoc basis and sometimes with little notice. There has been no system in place to 
ensure that each individual diver is offered the examination at least every three years 
(informant 1). The absence of such a system, as well as the lack of coordination and/or 
organisation around booking a diving doctor to carry out the examinations, both fall under 
the category of what Reason (1997) terms latent conditions.  
Divers´ lack of participation in the voluntary examination falls under the category of what 
Reason (1997) terms active failures. It may be argued that a diver who does not participate, 
or who does not provide full disclosure in with regard to own heath, is in fact committing 
an unsafe act. However, as Reason argues, unsafe acts can be seen as a consequence of 
latent conditions. Informant 2 states that DE1 must build up trust and confidence with the 
divers, and that adult education is required. Shortcomings within these areas may also be 
identified as latent conditions.  
So how does an organisation overcome latent conditions such as these? Aven and Renn 
(2010) state that good risk communication can help affected parties in reaching informed 
decisions. The results indicate that within DE1 there is a lack of communication 
concerning  
 the existence of the 3-yearly medical examinations 
 the reason for the program 
 the benefits of participating in the program 
 the choice of whether or not to participate in the program 
Also, some divers have simply not been offered to undergo the medical examination 
(informant 9 and 11). This supports comments from informant 13 and informant 1 
concerning the ad hoc way in which these are organised and the lack of a system for 
ensuring all divers receive an offer at least every three years.  
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For those divers that are aware of the 3-yearly medical examinations, but choose not to 
participate because they are suspicious, good risk communication could make a difference 
to their decision, or at the very least, contribute to a more informed decision being made.  
So what can be said with regard to the effectiveness of this barrier? As pointed out by 
informant 13 it is specifically designed to uncover long-term health effects. Further, the 
same informant rates it as an effective safety barrier. However, as it is voluntary, it only 
works if the diver chooses to participate. So in this case, Reason´s (1997) ”Swiss cheese” 
model will not contain successive layers of holes through which an accident trajectory may 
pass. Alarmingly, a whole layer of defence will be removed, making it very easy for an 
accident trajectory to pass through the remaining layer(s), as illustrated in figure 10 above. 
This leads to the inevitable conclusion that this particular safety barrier is not effective at 
all, or at least it is not constant. 
 
5.3 Annual health screening questionnaire 
Informants 1 and 2 from DE1 state that one of the challenges with the annual health-
screening questionnaire is the low response rate. The results indicate that one of the main 
reasons for non-participating is suspicion. It should be noted that the majority of the divers 
interviewed were British. As mentioned previously, only 12 of the 264 saturation divers 
registered with DE1 are Norwegian, the remainder are British. Although these divers work 
on the NCS, this does not necessarily mean that their attitudes towards trust and safety are 
the same as what may be found among Norwegian divers. A study by Tharaldsen 
(2011:94) found there existed differences in safety culture between UK and Norway 
respondents within an international drilling company operating on both the NCS and the 
BCS. Specifically, the results of the study indicated that UK workers exhibited “a more 
rule-based trust with regard to safety and between UK workers and managers”, whilst 
Norwegian workers “were characterised by equality and a common identity” (ibid). 
Communication with- and adult education of divers have been highlighted as important for 
improving the response rate to the questionnaire (informant 2). It may be argued that 
whether or not the response rate is low is relative. With regard to low response rate 
informant 12 (Operator 2) argues that the response rate is in fact not low when compared to 
similar screening questionnaires in the industry. Informant 3 (PSA) states low response 
rate is a challenge with the safety barrier, but attributes this to the short time span since its´ 
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implementation. Based on these statements there appears to be a lack of consensus within 
the industry as to what is an acceptable response rate. However, participation in the health-
screening questionnaire by the divers is voluntary. So, for the safety barrier to serve its 
purpose, divers must participate. As mentioned previously, DE3 and DE4 have had 
response rates ranging from 10% to 23% in the 2 years they have sent out the 
questionnaires since the implementation of the scheme in 2009. It can be argued then that 
in the case of the divers who did not participate the safety barrier has been non-functional. 
Again, as with the 3-yearly medical examination, it can therefore be argued that this is a 
weak barrier.  
These findings may be supported by Hollnagell (2008:228) who states symbolic barrier 
systems, such as soft defences, are “inexpensive and can be put in place rather quickly”, 
but are inefficient “since people can choose simply to ignore them”. It would seem 
imperative then; to communicate to the divers the benefits of participating in a long-term 
health follow up program. This might reduce the likely hood of the safety barrier being 
ignored. By communicating to the divers the known and documented long-term health 
risks associated with diving, even if the information is ambiguous, the divers will be able 
to make more informed decisions. These decisions concern a profession that may not only 
damage their health, but may also have an impact on their families and friends (Aven and 
Renn 2010:93).  
 
5.4 Health certificate for offshore divers 
The divers interviewed had mixed opinions with regard to the effectiveness of the health 
certificate for offshore divers. Notably, it was commented that the medical examination 
required to obtain this certificate was easy to pass (informant 5), and that it is possible to 
hide, or not disclose, medical information related to own health (informant 10). It was also 
stated that the quality or thoroughness of these medical examinations varies with different 
doctors (informant 9). These findings may be supported by Simpson and Roomes (1999), 
who conducted a survey “to assess variability of opinion regarding fitness to dive among 
doctors currently doing diving medical examinations”. The results indicated a lack of 
consensus with regard to what constitutes fitness to dive (ibid). Although that study 
concerned SCUBA divers, it may to some extent be related to medical examinations of 
offshore divers as the 81 doctors who participated in the survey were all members of a 
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underwater medical society. In Norway, as in the UK, there exist guidelines for use by 
diving doctors performing medical examinations on occupational divers (Norwegian Board 
of Health Supervision, 2000). Perhaps an audit, similar to that carried out by Sames et al. 
(2009), could contribute to ensuring that diving doctors are thorough and consistent in 
performing these medical examinations. Sames et al. (2009:765) found that five-yearly 
medical examinations of occupational divers (in New Zealand) have a low detection rate 
for health problems and also reported 
5.5 Additional noteworthy findings 
5.5.1 Employment conditions 
Similarly to communicating the known risks associated with diving, communicating the 
details of the long-term follow up program to the divers would also contribute to the 
divers´ ability to make informed decisions. Results indicate that loss of earning potential, 
i.e. not being able to continue a career as a diver, is a concern among divers. Again, this 
may be related to trust issues. In reports concerning risk exposed groups, doctors have 
maintained that long-term health follow up of individual divers is difficult when they are 
not employed (informant 3). Scandpower Risk Management AS (hereinafter referred to as 
Scandpower) carried out an analysis of risk in manned underwater operations at the request 
of Statoil, Norsk Hydro and Esso. The report suggests employment conditions of divers are 
an important consideration, as well as planning for ending diving career and re-education 
(Scandpower 2005:127). As pointed out by informant 15 from Operator 1, it is difficult to 
follow-up the health of divers that are not employed. Therefore, by operators requiring 
contractually that divers participate in the follow-up program, the effectiveness of the 
barriers is improved. Results indicate that there exists some ambiguity about the legality of 
making such requirements, however, due to the apparent flaws of the barriers, one may 
wonder if this is in fact a good way to manage this. 
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6 Conclusion 
This study shows that the effectiveness of the three safety barriers specifically intended to 
manage the long-term health risks to divers, the 3-yearly medical examination, the health 
certificate for offshore divers, and the exposure assessment, depends on divers voluntarily 
participating and to a certain extent also on coincidences. Here, the word coincidence 
refers to the ad hoc organisation of the 3-yearly medical examinations, which appears to 
leave some divers on the outside of the long-term follow up program.  
Reasons why divers do not participate in the long-term health follow up program include 
suspicion, career concerns, and also lack of information.  
Further, divers report that the thoroughness and consistency of the medical examinations 
carried out in connection with the health certificate for offshore divers is varied. 
These findings suggest that a combination of latent conditions and active failures leave the 
long-term health of divers in a vulnerable position. In light of these findings it is argued 
that the said safety barriers leave room for improvement with regard to their effectiveness. 
The long-term health of a diver should not be dependant on voluntary participation and 
coincidences. A diver´s health should be protected and followed up through a regulatory 
framework with no room for ambiguity or misinterpretation, and through sound risk 
management. 
 
6.1 Further research 
Due to the time constraints of this study a limited number of divers were interviewed. A 
further study, encompassing as many offshore divers registered on the Norwegian and 
British shelves as possible, could greatly enhance our insight into what is required to 
improve the effectiveness of the safety barriers. Further, the effectiveness of the said 
barriers from a medical stance could be beneficial to the diving industry. During the latter 
part of this study it came to attention that Helse Bergen HF, in connection with an 
assignment for the PSA, is evaluating the need for improving the health and fitness 
requirement for occupational divers. The report is expected to be released in 2012. 
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Appendices 
  
  
Appendix A: Informants 
Informant 1:  Health department, Diving entrepreneur 1 
 
Informant 2:  Diving management, Diving entrepreneur 1 
 
Informant 3:  Senior personnel, Petroleum Safety Authoríty 
 
Informant 4:  Anonymous 
Position: Diver, self-employed 
Experience: 20+ years as diver; diving work carried out post 2009 on NCS for DE1 
 
Informant 5:  Anonymous 
Position: Diver, employed by DE1  
Experience: 20+ years as diver; diving work carried out post 2009 on NCS for DE1 
 
Informant 6:  Anonymous 
Position: Diver, employed by DE1 
Experience: 15+ years as diver, diving work carried out post 2009 on NCS for DE1 
Informant 7:  Anonymous 
Position: Diver, employed by DE1 
Experience: 5+ years as diver, diving work carried out post 2009 on NCS for DE1 
 
Informant 8:  Anonymous 
Position: Diver, self-employed 
Experience: 20+ years as diver, diving work carried out post 2009 on NCS for DE1 
 
Informant 9:  Anonymous 
Position: Diver, self-employed 
Experience: 15+ years as diver, diving work carried out post 2009 on NCS for DE1 
  
 
Informant 10:  Anonymous 
Position: Diver, self-employed 
Experience: 20+ years as diver, diving work carried out post 2009 on NCS for DE1 
 
Informant 11:  Anonymous 
Position: Diver, self-employed 
Experience: 10+ years as diver, diving work carried out post 2009 on NCS for DE1 
 
Informant 12:  Anonymous, Advisor Diving, Operator 2 
 
Informant 13: Diving doctor 
 
Informant 14: Anonymous, Advisor Diving, Operator 1 
  
  
Appendix B: Request to interview divers 
Hello 
My name is Susanne and I am currently writing my masters thesis in Risk Management 
and Societal Safety. I have chosen to write about what safety barriers exist to prevent or 
decrease long-term health risks to divers, and will try to assess the effectiveness of these 
barriers (barriers in the form of law, regulation, standards, internal procedures, etc.). 
I have worked for DE1 Norway since 2006 and transferred to the HSE department in 2010. 
I know little about diving and even less about the health risks, which is partly my 
motivation for writing about this topic. 
Jane has kindly agreed to forward this email. I would very much like to interview you. It 
would only be a brief interview regarding whether or not you participate in the voluntary 
3-yearly medical examination and/or the annual health screening questionnaire and the 
reasons for this. Any information you give me will be strictly anonymous, which is to say 
that I will write down your answers but not your name or any other information that can be 
linked to you. We can put this in writing if you like. If you prefer I can also send you my 
questions in advance so that you can prepare your thoughts. 
Please let me know if you are available for an interview. Your participation would be 
greatly appreciated and would essentially be the central part of my study. 
I hope to hear from you. 
Regards, 
Susanne Walters 
  
  
Appendix C: Interview guides 
  
  
Interview with Health Department representative, DE1 
Please tell me about the long-term health follow-up of divers in DE1. 
 
What challenges exist with regard to the health-monitoring program? 
 
  
  
Interview with diving management representative, DE1 
With regard to the legislation about the health follow-up of divers, including NORSOK U-
100 §5.1.4, the Activities regulations §4 and 41, the WEA §3.1 and 10.11, how has DE1 
complied with these? 
 
What are the major challenges with the long-term health follow-up, if any? 
 
What improvements, if any, is DE1 looking to make with regard to the follow-up program? 
 
In your opinion, is the legislation appropriate as a safety barrier to reduce or prevent long-
term health risks to divers? 
 
  
  
Interview with PSA 
With regard to long-term health follow-up of divers, how did the annual health 
questionnaires come about? 
 
What, in your opinion, are the challenges with the long-term health follow-up of divers? 
 
If we regard the laws and regulations as a safety barrier (soft defence as defined by 
Reason), how effective is it in your opinion? 
 
It has come to my attention that some operators demand, in their contracts with 
entrepreneurs, that divers who work in their projects must participate in the long-term 
health follow-up program. Are they legally allowed to make such demands? 
 
With regard to exposure data as per regulatory requirements and NORSOK U-100, it has 
been stated that some divers operate with more than one logbook, one for each 
entrepreneur they work for, e.g. one for DE1 and one for DE2. Further it has been stated 
that the divers don´t necessarily declare all work carried out in between jobs, they may 
only show one logbook. Is the PSA aware of this and if yes, how can it be avoided?  
 
  
  
Interview with divers 
Age 
Nationality 
Worked as diver in petroleum industry since 
Date (year) of last diving job on Norwegian Continental Shelf 
Date (year) of last diving job on British Continental Shelf 
Employed/self-employed (if employed please also name employer)? 
Employed since? 
Member of union?  
If yes, which? 
 
Prevention or reduction of long-term health risks to divers 
With regard to minimizing long-term health risks to divers I have been made aware that 
there exists both compulsory and voluntary health monitoring programs/procedures such as 
for example the pre- and post-dive medical checks, 3-yearly medical examination, and 
annual health screenings (questionnaire). This interview will focus mainly on the voluntary 
programs. 
 
Have you ever participated in the 3-yearly medical examination? 
 
If yes, why? 
If no, why? 
 
Since 2009 a health screening questionnaire has been sent to divers. The questionnaire is 
confidential and personal information may only be viewed by the occupational health 
service. 
 
Have you ever responded to this questionnaire? 
 
If yes, why? 
If no, why? 
 
The response rate to the annual health screening questionnaire has been very low. Do you 
have any thoughts on why this may be? Please elaborate. 
 
Compulsory requirements such as  
  
 Offshore health certificate 
 Health certificate for offshore divers 
 Pre- and post-dive medical checks 
 Exposure data (self declaration) 
 
and voluntary programs such as  
 3-yearly medical examination 
 Annual health screening questionnaire 
can all be regarded as “soft” defences or safety barriers that are there to prevent or 
minimise health risks to divers.  
 
In your opinion, how effective are these safety barriers? 
 
Do you take any other measures, not identified above, to protect yourself against diving 
related health risks? 
 
Anything else you would like to add/comment? 
 
Thank you for your time. 
  
  
Appendix D: Annual health-screening questionnaire 
 
